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penditures) on business cycle volatility is studied for a panel of EU coun-
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of possible nonlinearities in the relationship between GDP growth volatil-
ity and fiscal stabilizers. The results show that the business cycle volatility
smoothing effect of fiscal stabilizers may revert at high levels. The results
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1 Introduction
Many economists see the main goal of fiscal policy in the stabilization of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. The usual underlying argument is that output volatility
has a negative impact on long-term growth (see e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
This assumption is inspired by several theoretical underpinnings, e.g. skill losses
due to temporary unemployment (Martin and Rogers, 1997), an increase in po-
litical uncertainty due to high business cycle volatility (Alesina et al., 1992),
credit-market imperfections that may force firms to cut their expenditure on re-
search and development (Stiglitz, 1994) or increased uncertainty with respect to
investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The stabilization of business cycle fluc-
tuations through fiscal policy can work through several different channels. The
most common channel are automatic stabilizers which smooth economic activity
through an automatic response via taxes and the transfer system but there are
also other components in the budget that may be stabilizing. Especially interna-
tional institutions seem to have consensus on the fact that automatic stabilizers
are effective in stabilizing the business cycle, as opposed to discretionary fiscal
policy measures which tend to have destabilizing (procyclical) effects due to,
e,g., implementation lags (see, e.g. Badinger, 2008).
Empirically there are three broad categories of contributions dealing with
the issue of the effectiveness of fiscal stabilizers1 , some of them focusing on the
expenditure side, some of them on the revenue side of the budget. Many interna-
tional institutions use their large-scale macro-models to estimate the elasticity
of tax revenues or public expenditures with respect to changes in output or the
output gap.2 The second approach is to characterize the response of output to
tax and spending shocks in the past by means of structural vector autoregressive
models in order to derive impulse-response functions (see e.g. Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002, De Castro, 2006). Finally, Fatás and Mihov (2001a, 2001b) test
the correlation between government size and output growth volatility within
cross country as well as panel data studies.
This paper re-assesses empirically the smoothing impact of fiscal stabilizers
using a panel of EU countries. Our model setting partly builds on earlier work
by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Fatás and Mihov (2001a, 2001b). However,
it extends it in several ways. First of all, while earlier work is mostly based
on cross-sectional data and uses panel data only for selected aspects, our paper
relies on pooled estimation. Second, we use an extended set of economic and
political variables that has not been used in this context so far.
We initially test the effectiveness of fiscal stabilizers within a linear frame-
1We use the broader term fiscal stabilizers instead of automatic stabilizers since we do not
only use the classical categories representing automatic stabilizers, namely direct taxes and
unemployment benefits, but test all subcategories of the revenue and expenditure side.
2See e.g. Van den Noord (2000), using the OECD-INTERLINK model, or Barrell and Pina
(2003), using the NiGEM model. Brunila et al. (2002), using the EC-QUEST model.
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work but then also investigate whether there is a threshold level beyond which
this stabilizing effect might revert. The hypothesis that nonlinearities might ex-
ist is partly based on the literature that deals with growth effects of fiscal policy.
Here theoretical results (see e.g. Barro, 1990) predict a negative growth effect
in countries where the size of government exceeds a certain threshold. Under
the assumption that there is a robust negative correlation between volatility of
output and long term growth, the resulting inverse U-shaped relationship be-
tween government size and growth would translate into a U-shaped relationship
between government expenditures and output volatility. While a related non-
linearity hypothesis, namely that government size could have a negative growth
impact when it exceeds a certain threshold level, has been frequently formulated
(see e.g. Barro, 1990, Slemrod, 1995), this is the first paper, to the knowledge
of the authors, which addresses this issue empirically in the context of fiscal
stabilizers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the impact of fiscal
stabilizers on business cycle volatility within a linear framework, also taking ac-
count of the potential endogeneity between the variables. Section 3 investigates
the possibility of nonlinearities. Section 4 applies the same methodology to the
different subcomponents of government expenditures and revenues to examine
which of these components can most directly be related to the stabilizing aspect
of fiscal policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Do fiscal stabilizers indeed stabilize? —
A first approach
When investigating the interaction between fiscal stabilizers and the volatility
of output growth the first issue is the definition of an appropriate proxy for
fiscal stabilizers.3 We will focus on the most general measure: the average ratio
of government spending to GDP. Obviously the automatic component of fiscal
stabilizers does not only work from the expenditure side, but also from the rev-
enue side, mainly through personal income and corporate taxes. However, there
is no clear consensus in the empirical literature which side of the government
budget is more appropriate when investigating the impact of fiscal stabilizers:
Van den Noord (2000) and Fatás and Mihov (2001a) for instance, argue on the
importance of the government expenditure side, while the European Commis-
sion (2002) — although in a slightly different context — refers to the revenue side
as being the one that is more influenced by the business cycle. We start by
focusing on the expenditure side, however, we will also present evidence on the
revenue side in section 4.
3Our basic data set consists of yearly data on 14 EU countries covering the period 1970 to
1999. Our data set contains all current EU countries with the only exception of Luxembourg.
For some countries the time range is shorter so that the sample is not balanced.
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The use of the original, unadjusted government expenditure series as a proxy
for fiscal stabilizers is common within this strand of literature. However, total
government spending does not only capture a reactive component that can be
related to the automatic stabilization function (as well the part of expenditures
that is stable irrespective of the stage of the cycle), but also a third, autonomous
component of spending that reflects discretionary fiscal policy measures. Em-
pirical evidence for a negative relationship between government size and output
growth fluctuations could thus, among other reasons, be due to discretionary
policy measures. We will therefore focus our analysis only on the part of gov-
ernment expenditures that is left after filtering out discretionary policy.
In the literature there are several approaches to extracting the stabilizing
component of government expenditure. One option is to look at the subcompo-
nents of government spending or revenues that can be related more directly to
the automatic stabilizing function. Another approach is the one adopted by the
IMF and the OECD. Here a ‘cyclically adjusted’ fiscal balance is constructed
by relating the budget deficit to the state of the cycle relative to a cyclical in-
dicator such as the output gap (see,e.g. Larch and Salto 2005). Our approach
is estimating an unobserved components model following Harvey (1985, 1989)
in order to separate a trend, a cyclical component and an irregular part of the
government expenditure ratio series. The irregular part is subsequently sub-
tracted from the data as it might not represent the automatic stabilizing part
of government expenditures. For the rest of the paper we will refer to it as
adjusted government expenditure. To get a first impression of the nature of the
relationship between fiscal stabilizers and output growth volatility, we divide
our data set into six subperiods (1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94,
1995-99) and estimate the following baseline regression:
V OLGROWTHit = β(GOV EXPit) + uit, (1)
where the left hand variable is the standard deviation of output growth in period
t (t = 1, ..., 6 stands for each of the subperiods described in the footnote) for
country i and GOV EXPit is the logged ratio of government expenditures over
GDP, adjusted for the irregular component.
Insert Table 1 around here
The regression results for equation (1) — based on different assumptions for
the error term — are presented in Table 1. The first column shows the result
for the assumption that the error term is independent of the cross-sectional
units (countries) and iid normal (that is, the panel is estimated as if it were a
cross-country regression including a constant). The second column shows the
results for the assumption of fixed country effects, and the third column shows
the estimated β under the assumption of fixed country and time effects. The
results in Table 1 all show a negative coefficient for β, with β being highly
significant for the latter two specifications. The results thus seem to confirm
that fiscal stabilizers have had a smoothing impact on the business cycle. Still,
4
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additional variables might affect both volatility and government size, we hence
add three control variables common in the literature to our baseline regression,
namely the unemployment rate (see e.g. Feldman, 2008), inflation volatility (as
an indicator for monetary policy) and GDP per capita.4 The new specification
thus is:
V OLGROWTHit = β1(GOV EXPit) + β2(UNEMPLit) + (2)
β3(V OLINFLit) + β4(GDPpcit) + uit
Table 2 (column 1) shows the results of equation (2). The negative and
significant coefficient for government size confirms the previous results.
Insert Table 2 around here
The main problem with equation (2) is the potential endogeneity of govern-
ment size. Rodrik (1998) comments that as long as one of the goals of gov-
ernments is to reduce output growth volatility, economies that display higher
volatility might choose larger governments to stabilize their cycles. In this case
equation (2) would be subject to an endogeneity problem and OLS estimation
could lead to biased results.
To account for potential endogeneity we need to find instruments for govern-
ment size. This is done by estimating an equation which relates government size
with a set of economic and political variables. All variables that display a robust
and significant relationship with government expenditures but are not correlated
with the error term are obvious candidates for instruments. The following vari-
ables were tested: GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, openness, interest
payments on public debt, an indicator for government strength (represented
by the Banzhaf Index), the number of elections and the size of the economy
(measured through population). As interest payments, openness, government
strength and population came out significant, they were taken as instruments
in equation (2).The Sargan test for the validity of instruments cannot reject the
null of no correlation between the instruments and the errors in equation (2).
The results of the re-estimation of (2) using instrumental variables are presented
in Table 2 (second column). Even though the coefficient for government size is
still negative, it is now insignificant, which casts doubt on the results from the
OLS-estimation above. However, it could also be an indication for nonlinearities
in the relationship between government size and economic volatility that have
not been explicitly modelled.
4Several more variables were tested as a robustness check, e.g. openness, population,
average inflation levels, average levels of core inflation and GDP growth. The coefficients
never appeared significant and left the other coefficients basically unchanged.
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3 A nonlinear effect of fiscal stabilizers?
The results of the previous section provide no clear cut picture concerning the
smoothing capacity of fiscal stabilizers suggesting that nonlinearities not in-
cluded in the baseline model may be a present. The linear model already
gives evidence for diminishing returns to the stabilizing property of govern-
ment spending. We could, however, hypothesize that the effectiveness of this
fiscal policy tool is subject to extra diminishing returns that go beyond the ones
already implied by the use of the logarithm of government expenditures, possi-
bly even reverting beyond a certain threshold. If such nonlinearities exist, the
conclusion of a smoothing impact of fiscal stabilizers of previous studies may
not hold for all levels of government expenditures but has to be investigated
with reference to the size of the government.5
As a very first attempt to examine empirically the evidence for nonlineari-
ties in the relationship between business cycle volatility and government size we
apply the linearity test proposed by Hansen (1999). We test the linear model
against a piecewise linear model where the effect of government expenditure on
growth volatility depends on the level of government expenditure, and explic-
itly estimate the threshold level of government expenditures separating the two
regimes. Although the methodology in Hansen (1999) does not account for in-
strumental variable estimation, it could provide first evidence for nonlinearities
in the relationship. The threshold estimation procedure identifies exactly one
threshold at a (logged) government expenditure ratio of 3.67, and rejects the
null of linearity at the usual 5% significance level. For government size levels
below the threshold there is a significant negative relationship between the gov-
ernment expenditure ratio and GDP growth volatility. Beyond the threshold
level, however, the coefficient is negative but not significant, indicating that the
smoothing effect of fiscal stabilizers does not apply in this region. This first
evidence opens the question of the specific nonlinear form to be tested. Here
a useful econometric tool is the Nearest Neighbor Fit method (see e.g. Cleve-
land, 1993 and 1994).6 The resulting nonlinear curve is presented in Figure 1.7
The parabolic form suggests a leveling out of the smoothing capacity of fiscal
stabilizers with the possibility of a reversed effect beyond the minimum.
Insert Figure 1 around here
5Buti and Van den Noord (2003) provide a theoretical framework that explicitly predicts
a nonlinear relationship between government size and GDP growth volatility.
6This non-parametric approach fits for each data point in the sample a local linear regres-
sion line, weighting the other observations: Data points that are relatively far from the point
being evaluated get small weights in the sum of squared residuals, while closer data points get
higher weights.
7Figure 1 shows the residuals of equation (2), estimated under the restriction β1 = 0 (that
is the part of GDP growth volatility that cannot be explained by the right hand side variables
other than GOV EXPit in equation (2)) against the fitted levels of government expenditures
over GDP using the instruments and exogenous variables. This is the variable actually used
instead of GOV EXPit for the instrumental variables estimation.
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Based on this evidence we modify our model given by (2) by letting the
government expenditure ratio enter in a quadratic form to account for these
nonlinearities:
V OLGROWTHit = β1(GOV EXPit) + β2(GOV EXPit)
2 +
β
3
(UNEMPLit) + β4(V OLINFLit) + (3)
β5(GDPpcit) + uit
The estimation is carried out using the same set of instruments as in equation
(2), augmented with the squared instruments.Table 3 shows the results of the
linear model and the model with the quadratic specification. The coefficient for
government size is highly significant for the linear as well as for the quadratic
variable, thereby confirming the evidence for nonlinearities. The fitted parabolic
curve has its low point at 3.63 (in logs) which is corresponding to a government
expenditure ratio of approximately 38 percent, a value close to the one indicated
by the threshold technique.
Insert Table 3 around here
In order to provide an intuition about the magnitudes of the nonlinearity
effect the following exercise was performed: For a country displaying a govern-
ment expenditure ratio corresponding to the median value of the distribution in
our panel (40.63%), an increase of public spending by one percentage point will,
ceteris paribus, raise the standard deviation of output growth by 0.02 points.
The same increase in government spending for a country situated at the 25%
percentile of the distribution (expenditure ratio: 35.87%) will lead to a decrease
in business cycle volatility of 0.01 points. A country at the 75% percentile
(spending ratio: 44.14%) finally would increase cyclical volatility by 0.04 points
when expanding government expenditures by one percentage point.
Insert Figure 2 around here
Even though due to data limitations fitting curves to single countries is not
possible, it is an additional useful visual illustration to assign to each country
a different symbol, as shown in Figure 2. To be more specific: The point cloud
may not consist of single country cases that actually support the estimated par-
abolic curve individually, but it could be the cross country differences that pay
responsible for the U-shaped curve. Figure 2 reveals several clusters of countries.
Spain and Greece are countries with a sufficiently low government spending ra-
tio to experience a stabilization effect of an increase in public expenditures. A
larger group of countries lying at the right part of the curve (Sweden, Denmark,
Netherlands, France, Belgium) seem to support the finding that a further in-
crease in the size of the government can have destabilizing effects once a certain
level is reached. Two further countries (Italy and Finland) actually mimic the
parabolic curve. There is, however, the interesting case of Germany and Aus-
tria, who seem to show a negative relationship between government size and
7
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volatility although the data points almost entirely lie to the right of our esti-
mated low point of the curve. This may raise the issue of whether an efficient
use of government revenues and an appropriate design of the tax system could
shift the curve to the right.
To sum up, our results indicate a nonlinear relationship between government
size and output growth volatility. For relatively low levels of the government
expenditure ratio fiscal stabilizers have the desired impact such that they reduce
business cycle fluctuations. For higher levels, however, the effect is, at best, not
significant, but it might as well revert.
4 Towards a narrower definition of government
size — which fiscal components stabilize most?
Fiscal stabilizers obviously do not only work from the expenditure side but also
from the revenue side. The aim of this section is to analyze the nature of the
smoothing effect from the revenue side. Using a disaggregated data set allows
us to investigate which subcomponents of government expenditure or revenue
can be most directly related to the stabilizing aspect of fiscal policy.
We thus rerun equations (2) and (3) by first substituting government spend-
ing by total revenues (REVEN it) that is computed as the sum of direct and
indirect taxes and social security and other transfers received by the govern-
ment. We then repeat this procedure using subcomponents of government ex-
penditures, namely non-wage government consumption (GOVCONSnw it), wage
government consumption (GOVCONSw it), government gross investment (IN-
VEST it), subsidies (SUBSIDit) and social security transfers paid by the gov-
ernment (SOCSEC it). Furthermore we also use transfers (TRANS it) that is
the sum of subsidies, social security transfers and other transfers paid by the
government. On the revenue side we look at two subcomponents: direct taxes
(TAXdir it) and indirect taxes (TAXindir it).
8
Intuitively the subcomponents on the spending side that are most directly
related to the theoretical definition of fiscal stabilizers are social security trans-
fers and subsidies. Investment, on the other hand, can be expected to consist
mainly of discretionary measures. GOVCONSw it might contain a discretionary
as well as a fiscal stabilizing part while the non-wage fraction should not be
closely related to fiscal stabilizers. On the revenue side indirect taxes do not
show the standard attributes of fiscal stabilizers so that we expect regression
8All fiscal measures are used as logs of the share in GDP and those that are expected to
contain a significant discretionary part (INVEST it and GOVCONSw it) are adjusted following
the same approach applied to the government expenditure ratio. In all cases the estimation is
done using the same instruments selected for the case of the overall government expenditure
measure.
8
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results to deviate substantially from the ones derived in the previous sections.
Direct taxes, on the other hand, should show a high degree of stabilizing prop-
erties, possibly also leveling out beyond a certain threshold.
Insert Table 4 around here
The results for the various subcomponents of government expenditures and
revenues are given in Table 4. The results for total revenues show the same
characteristics as those of the government spending ratio: Accounting for the
possibility of endogeneity, the coefficient for total revenues is negative but not
significant. Using a nonlinear model, however, the coefficients are highly signifi-
cant for the linear as well as for the quadratic term. Thus the same implication
holds namely that the smoothing effect of fiscal stabilizers from the revenue
side may vanish for higher levels. The fact that a similar result applies to direct
taxes while this is not the case for indirect taxes supports the hypothesis that
personal and corporate income taxes are most directly related to the theoret-
ical definition of fiscal stabilizers. One can interpret this result in the light of
the discussion on tax reforms that usually assume a trade-off between efficiency
and stabilization effects. Our results suggest that, for countries with a high tax
burden, tax cuts can both increase efficiency and contribute to a less volatile
business cycle at the same time. Concerning the subcomponents on the ex-
penditure side there is evidence for nonlinearities only for non-wage government
consumption whereas the other components do not show any parabolic relation-
ship. It is interesting to note, though, that wages seems to smoothen output in a
linear fashion, as indicated by the negative and significant sign in the regression.
The main result is therefore that of those subcomponents that are expected
to be most directly related to fiscal stabilizers, only revenues and direct taxes
show the hypothesized smoothing impact (for lower levels). This effect, however,
reverts for higher levels and could actually increase cyclical volatility. Subsidies
and social security transfers, on the other hand, do not have a smoothing im-
pact, neither in the linear nor in the nonlinear model setting.
5 Conclusions
The effect of fiscal stabilizers (proxied by the government expenditure share
adjusted for discretionary policy) on cyclical volatility is tested for a panel of
EU-member states in the last three decades within a linear as well as a non-
linear framework. Evidence from the linear model is mixed: While the basic
OLS results confirm the finding that fiscal stabilizers have reduced business cy-
cle fluctuations this effect is no longer significant when accounting for potential
endogeneity of government size.
However, the results based on a nonlinear model setting indicate a smoothing
effect for lower levels of government size, but the ‘returns to smoothing’ dimin-
9
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ish in a stronger fashion than the one implied by the logarithmic specification.
For countries with a high government expenditure ratio the smoothing effect
vanishes and cyclical volatility may thus even rise. The results appear robust to
the exclusion of outliers, modifications in the specific non-linear form, the use
of a different set of control variables and instruments as well as a generalization
of the adjustment mechanism for the government expenditure ratio. On a dis-
aggregated level, we find that the wage government consumption and indirect
taxes smoothen volatility in a linear fashion, the non-wage government consump-
tion, direct taxes and total revenues display the nonlinearity mentioned above,
namely a stabilizing property up to an estimated threshold which then eventu-
ally reverts. The validity of the main findings on the revenue side strengthens
our results against the background of the discussion on which side of the budget
to use as a proxy for fiscal stabilizers.
Our results suggest that it may be necessary to reassess the role of the
fiscal stabilizers in the nonlinearity context. The preference of international
institutions for rules-based fiscal policy (tantamount to letting the automatic
stabilizers play), notably in Europe, stems from the fact that the last three
decades were marked by prolonged periods of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. This
asymmetric reaction of fiscal policy to the economic cycle led institutions to the
conclusion that a purely rules-based fiscal policy (in the same reign as mone-
tary policy) would lead to a better economic outcome in the sense of reduced
volatility. Given the negative relationship between government size and cyclical
volatility in prior studies, this notion seems justified. However, the nonlinear
model setting of our paper reassesses this view in a critical way. The discussion
on the effect of fiscal stabilizers and optimal government size may gain realism
by taking into account nonlinearities such as the ones modeled in this study.
Thus the main conclusion is that policy recommendations to let fiscal stabilizers
play fully should be supplemented by taking into account a second dimension:
the absolute level of fiscal stabilizers. One should be aware of the fact that the
government size plays a crucial role in determining the nature of the returns to
smoothing of fiscal stabilizers. Therefore, although the full operation of fiscal
stabilizers could be desirable, their overall extent may have to be reconsidered.
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Appendix: Data sources
The data on government expenditures and revenues were taken from the OECD
Economic Outlook database. Real GDP per capita and GDP growth were com-
puted in 1995 prices using data from the World Development Indicators 2001
(World Bank) except the data for West Germany (1970-91), which were built
from the International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund). The
openness variable was retrieved from the World Development Indicators 2001
(World Bank) except the data for West Germany (1960-91), which were taken
from the Penn World Tables 5.5. The source of data concerning population is
the Penn World Tables 5.5. Data on unemployment and inflation were taken
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. The data on political variables are
from Huber, Kocher and Sutter (2002).
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Table 1: GDP growth volatility and adjusted government size
Variable Common intercept Fixed effects (one-way) Fixed effects (two-way)
GOV EXP -0.95 (0.71) -2.68 ∗∗∗(1.01) -3.04∗∗∗(1.02)
Observations 72 72 72
R2
adj
0.03 0.09 0.37
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of GDP growth rates in all specifica-
tions. OLS estimation. White heteroskedasticity/serial correlation-corrected standard errors
in parenthesis. Specification (3) includes only significant time dummies. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for
1% (5%) [10%] significant.
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Table 2: GDP volatility and adjusted government size: OLS and
IV Estimation
Variable OLS IV
GOV EXP -3.14 ∗∗ (1.39) -2.94 (1.93)
UNEMPL 0.17 ∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.17 ∗∗∗ (0.05)
V OLINFL 0.24 ∗∗ (0.11) 0.24 ∗∗∗ (0.07)
GDPpc 2.49 ∗ (1.45) 2.47 ∗ (1.54)
Observations 72 72
R2
adj
0.66 0.66
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of GDP growth rates in all specifications.
The column labelled IV shows the estimates using instrumental variables. Instruments used:
openness, interest payments on debt, government strength, population. Two-way fixed effects
error component. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] significant.
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Table 3: GDP volatility and adjusted government size: quadratic
model
Variable Linear model Quadratic model
GOV EXP -2.94 (1.93) -36.57 ∗∗ (16.74)
GOV EXP 2 5.03 ∗∗ (2.47)
UNEMPL 0.17 ∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.19 ∗∗∗ (0.05)
V OLINFL 0.24 ∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.21 ∗∗∗ (0.07)
GDPpc 2.47 ∗ (1.54) 2.84 ∗ (1.46)
Observations 72 72
R2
adj
0.66 0.69
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of GDP growth rates in all specifications.
Instruments used: openness, interest payments on debt, government strength, population.
Two-way fixed effects error component. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] significant.
16
Page 16 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 4: GDP volatility and different measures for automatic
stabilizers
Linear Nonlinear
GOVCONSnw −4.28(2.70) −13.01∗∗∗(4.37)
GOVCONSnw2 3.17∗∗(1.34)
GOVCONSw −4.31∗∗(1.72) −19.91 (15.83)
GOVCONSw2 3.14(3.33)
INV EST −0.94(0.66) −5.93(5.60)
INV EST 2 2.51(2.69)
SUBSID 0.56(1.12) −0.40(0.47)
SUBSID2 −0.84(0.54)
SOCSEC −4.49(2.93) −7.13(11.11)
SOCSEC2 0.98(2.31)
TRANS 0.21(0.86) −4.01(4.51)
TRANS2 0.81(0.84)
TAXdir −0.26(0.73) −6.49∗∗(2.81)
TAXdir2 1.43∗(0.73)
TAXindir −2.81∗∗(1.24) 8.80(24.38)
TAXindir2 −2.21(5.17)
REV EN −2.37(1.53) −36.43∗∗(16.61)
REV EN2 5.01∗∗(2.46)
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of GDP growth rates in all specifications.
Instruments used: openness, interest payments on debt, government strength, population.
Two-way fixed effects error component. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] significant.
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Figure 1: The Nearest Neighbor Fit curve
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Figure 2: The parabolic curve: decomposition into single countries
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